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Abstract In this paper, we present an identity-based explicit authenticated key agreement protocol
that is provably secure without random oracles. The protocol employs a new method to isolate a session
key from key confirmation keys so that there is no direct usage of hash functions in the protocol. The
protocol is proved secure without random oracles in a variant of Bellare and Rogaway style model, an
exception to current proof method in this style model in the ID-based setting. We believe that this key
isolation method is novel and can be further studied to construct more efficient protocols.
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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on an identity based key
agreement protocol with a standard proof. We
introduce some concepts to parse the topic in-
cluding an explicit authenticated key agreement
protocol, an identity-based protocol, common
security properties of key agreement protocols,
proof models of such protocols and usage of ran-
dom oracles in this field. Related works about
identity-based key agreement protocols, security
properties, proof models and usage of random
oracles are embed in above concepts introduc-
tion parts.
An explicit authenticated key agreement
protocol is a key agreement protocol which pro-
vides explicit key authentication [1]. A key
∗ This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No 60473027, also by
Sun Yat-Sen university under Grant No 35000-2910025,35000-3171912
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agreement protocol or mechanism is a key es-
tablishment technique in which a shared se-
cret is derived by two (or more) parties as a
function of information contributed by each of
these, and ideally no party can predetermine
the resulting value. Key establishment is a pro-
cess or protocol whereby a shared secret be-
comes available to two or more parties for sub-
sequent cryptographic use. Explicit key au-
thentication is the property obtained when both
implicit key authentication and key confirma-
tion hold. Implicit key authentication is the
property whereby one party is assured that no
other party aside from a specifically identified
second party (and possibly additional identified
trusted parties) may access to a particular se-
cret key. Finally, key confirmation is the prop-
erty whereby one party is assured that a second
party (possibly unidentified) actually has pos-
session of a particular secret key.
A key agreement protocol is said to be
identity-based (ID-based) if the identity infor-
mation of the party involved is used as the
party’s public key. After Shamir proposed the
idea of identity-based asymmetric key pairs [2],
a few identity-based key agreement protocols
based on Shamir’s idea have been developed,
such as [3-5]. However the practical ID-based
protocols boomed after appeared the work of
[6] and [7] based on pairing techniques, which
include [8-16]. The practical protocols enjoy
some security properties, such as perfect for-
ward security (PFS), key compromise imperson-
ation resilience (KCI) etc.
Usually, some security properties are used
to evaluate the security of key agreement pro-
tocols, including known session key security
(KSK), unknown key-share resilience (UKS),
PFS, and KCI etc. By KSK, we mean that the
compromise of one session key should not com-
promise the keys established in other sessions.
UKS means that party A should not be able to
be coerced into sharing a key with party C when
in fact A thinks that she/he is sharing the key
with some party B. PFS in the two-party case
usually means that if their private keys are com-
promised, the secrecy of session keys previously
established by the two parties should not be af-
fected. If the condition is relaxed to only one
principle, it is called partially forward security
(P-FS). If the condition is restricted by adding
the loss of the third trusted party’s master key
in the ID-based scenario, it is called master-key
forward security (M-FS) [15]. By KCI, we mean
that the compromise of party A’s long-term pri-
vate key should not enable the adversary to im-
personate other parties to A. Some of the above
security properties can be captured by a Bellare
and Rogaway (BR) style model.
To the best of our knowledge, there are some
models to prove ID-based protocols, including
BR model [17], BRP model [18], BCP model
[19], CK model [20], UC model [21] etc. Most
ID-based protocols are proved in some variants
of the BR model, such as protocols in [9,12-16].
Usually, an adversary in a BR style model is
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powered by some kinds of queries, such as Send,
Reveal, Corrupt queries etc. The execution of a
protocol is described as oracle responses to the
adversary’s queries. After polynomial bounded
times queries, the adversary is expected to pass
a test with a non-negligible probability. If the
adversary cannot pass the test and the protocol
transcripts satisfy some secure conditions, it is
believed that the protocol is secure in the de-
fined model. Roughly all BR style models are
defined and used in the above fashion.
The original BR model provides us a good
framework but it is not suitable for key agree-
ment protocols. Blake-Wilson, Johnson, and
Meneze (BJM) extended the BR model to the
public key setting [22]. The KSK and UKS
properties have been built into the BJM model.
The KCI was built into another variant model
proposed by Cheng et al in the definition of
no-matching [23] for authenticated key agree-
ment with key confirmation protocols. So one
can prove a protocol secure with one fresh con-
dition capturing KSK, UKS, and KCI proper-
ties [15]. For PFS, there is another independent
fresh condition is defined, and another indepen-
dent proof procedure is needed [15,23,24]. An-
other security property SSR also takes the way
to define an independent fresh condition, which
considers the leakage of temporal private keys
[23-24]. Here we just give arguments about the
PFS and SSR properties out of our proof model
so that we can present a more clear proof pro-
cedure without random oracles in the model.
Blake-Wilson etc adopted the random ora-
cle model (ROM) in their proof procedure. The
powerful tool was proposed by Bellare and Ro-
gaway. It is used almost in every key agreement
protocols with key confirmation after Blake -
Wilson etc’s work, where hash functions are
used to isolate a session key from confirmation
keys. Recently ROM is debated for its unin-
stantiable property [25-27]. Following the con-
servative culture in cryptography [28], we be-
lieve that it is meaningful to provide a proof
without ROM for key agreement protocols. At
least, it can reveal what happened when ROM is
absent. Note that a traditional Deffie-Hellman
protocol was proved in [24] without ROM. Their
proof lacks an obvious no-matching proof since
their protocol was under the assumption of du-
plex channel, i.e. simultaneous message trans-
mission.
Our Contributions
We fail to find some direct related works
about identity based explicit key agreement pro-
tocols with a standard proof. In fact, this is the
purpose of our protocol. We note the trend of
stand proof for schemes and protocols. Also we
note that there is no explicit authenticated key
agreement protocols with a stand proof in the
identity based cryptography field. Motivated by
Gentry’s excellent work[29], we are deliberated
to design a protocol with a stand proof. We
deem that this protocol design method can be
applied further if some more efficient schemes
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than Gentry’s are proposed.
The main difference of our protocol design
method lies in the MAC key and session key
generation and isolation fashion, which makes
it possible that there is no direct usage of hash
functions in our protocol. Let’s explain our de-
sign procedure step by step. To exclude ROM
in ID-based protocols, we firstly adopt a private
key generation method where hash functions are
not needed. Gentry in EuroCrypt 2006 pro-
posed an IND-CPA ID-based encryption scheme
[29], which can be proven secure without ran-
dom oracles. His method is adopted here. Sec-
ondly we need another method to isolate a ses-
sion key from confirmation keys. We use key
materials of a session key as confirmation keys if
key materials and the session key can construct
a hard problem. For example, considering the
tuple (g, gx, gy, gxy), we can use (gx, gy) as con-
firmation keys and gxy as the session key. Then
the Deffie-Hellman problem isolates confirma-
tion keys from the session key. At last, we use
MTI serials (C0) protocol to hide confirmation
keys from an adversary.
Then we elaborate to give the stand proof.
A key step is to show the indistinguishability of
random confirmation keys from real confirma-
tion keys in a protocol run. With such a con-
clusion, we can deduce adversary’s no-matching
advantage to a MAC forger’s advantage. With
the authentication conclusion, we can further
construct a simulator to solve a hard problem,
who plays a test game with an adversary, so as
to deduce adversary’s advantage to the simu-
lator’s advantage. The proof steps are similar
with Blake-Wilson etc’s work but with a big dif-
ference that there is no ROM.
Roadmap
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
The introduction of bilinear maps, and com-
plexity assumption of our protocol are reviewed
in Section 2. In Section 3, we present our ID-
EAKA protocol. The security model, proof and
security properties of the protocol are provided
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review the definition of
bilinear maps and related complexity assump-
tions.
2.1 Bilinear Maps
Basic notations that are used throughout this
paper are as follows.
1. G and GT are two (multiplicative) cyclic
groups of prime order p;
2. g is a generator of G;
3. e: G×G → GT is a bilinear map.
Let G and GT be two groups as above. A
bilinear map is a map e: G×G → GT with the
following properties:
1. Bilinear: for all u, v in G and a, b in Zp,
we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab;
Hai-Bo Tian et al.: An ID-EAKA Protocol without Random Oracles 5
2. Non-degenerate: e(g, g) 6= 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the
group action in G can be computed efficiently
and there exists a group GT and an efficiently
computable bilinear map e: G × G → GT as
above. Here the bilinear map is symmetric since
e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab = e(gb, ga).
2.2 Complexity Assumptions
The security of our protocol is based on a
complexity assumption that is known as a trun-
cated version of the decisional augmented bilin-
ear Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption in [29]
(truncated decisional ABDHE).
Truncated q-ABDHE
The problem is that given a vector of q+3 ele-
ments
(g′, g′(α




as input, outputs e(g, g′)(α





i) below. An algorithm
A has advantage ε in solving a truncated q-
ABDHE problem if Pr[A(g′, g′q+2, g, g1, ..., gq) =
e(gq+1, g
′)] ≥ ε, where the probability is over
the random choice of generators g, g′ in G, the
random choice of α in Zp, and the random bits
used by A.
The assumption is that there is no such an
probability polynomial time (p.p.t) algorithm A
has a non-negligible advantage ε.
Truncated decisional q-ABDHE
The problem of decisional version of truncated
q-ABDHE is defined as one would expect. An
algorithm A that outputs b ∈ {0, 1} has ad-
vantage ε in solving a truncated decisional q-
ABDHE problem if
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr[A(g′, g′q+2, g, g1, ..., gq, e(gq+1, g
′)) = 0]
−Pr[A(g′, g′q+2, g, g1, ..., gq, Z) = 0]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ ε
where the probability is over the random choice
of generators g, g′ in G, the random choice of α
in Zp, the random choice of Z ∈ GT , and the
random bits consumed by A.
The truncated decisional (t, ε, q)-ABDHE
assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm
has advantage at least ε in solving the truncated
decisional q-ABDHE problem in G.
Remarks
We note the truncated q-ABDHE problem was
introduced by Gentry [29]. The normal ver-
sion, which is not truncated, is called the q-
ABDHE problem. The q-ABDHE problem has
additional (q−1) input terms, which seems eas-
ier to solve than the truncated version. The q-
ABDHE problem is similar with the q-BDHE
problem used in [30,31]. The difference is that
the q-ABDHE problem has an additional input
term g′(α
q+2). Gentry argued that introducing
the additional term did not appear to ease the
computation of e(g, g′)α
q+1
, since the input vec-
tor was missing the term g(α
−1) [29].
6 J. Comput. Sci. & Technol., Month 200X, Vol.21, No.X
2.3 MAC Algorithm
We use the MAC security definition in [32],
where a practical one key CBC MAC scheme
is defined. We need the unforgeable definition
here.
A MAC algorithm is a map MAC : KMAC×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, where KMAC is a set of keys
and we write MACK(·) for MAC(K, ·). We say
that an adversary AMACK(·) forges if A outputs
(M,MACK(M)) where A never queried M to














where the maximum is over all adversaries who
run in time at most t, make at most q queries,
and each query is at most u bits. We say that
a MAC algorithm is secure if AdvMAC(t, q, u) is
sufficiently small.
3 The ID-EAKA Protocol
There are three entities involved in our pro-
tocol: two users Alice and Bob who wish to
establish an authenticated shared secret session
key, and a PKG who generates user private keys
using its public/private key pairs.
The PKG generates its public/private key
pairs as follows. Let G and GT be groups of
order p, and let e : G×G → GT be the bilinear
map. The PKG picks randomly generators g,
h ∈ G and α ∈ Zp. It sets g1 = gα ∈ G and
gT = e(g, g) ∈ GT . The public/private key pairs
are given by public key = (g, g1, h, gT , MAC),
private key = α, where MAC is a public MAC
algorithm enjoying unforgeable property. Note
that MAC : KMAC × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n. We
assume that the key set KMAC is the group GT .
Certainly, we also can assume that there is a
public algorithm to uniformly map elements in
GT to the key set KMAC . For simplicity, we just
use GT as KMAC in the protocol description.
The PKG generates user keys as follows. To
generate a private key for identity ID ∈ Zp,
the PKG generates random rID ∈ Zp, and out-
puts the private key dID = (rID, hID), where
hID = (hg
−rID)1/(α−ID). If ID = α, the PKG
aborts.
With user keys, Alice and Bob run the fol-
lowing protocol to establish a shared session key
with explicit key authentication. We use IDA
and IDB to denote the identification strings of
Alice and Bob. Figure 1 depicts the protocol.
The detail procedure is as follows.
1. Alice uniformly at random selects x ∈ Zp,
computes M11 = (g1g
−IDB)x and M12 =
gxT . Alice sends M1 = IDA||M11||M12 to
Bob, where symbol || denotes concatena-
tion.
2. Bob uniformly at random selects y ∈ Zp,
computes M211 = (g1g
−IDA)y, M212 = g
y
T ,
and M22 = MACKMBA(M1||IDB||M211||
M212) where KMBA = (M12)
rIDB e(M11,
Hai-Bo Tian et al.: An ID-EAKA Protocol without Random Oracles 7
Alice Bob
1 1
|| ( ) ||B
ID x x
A T
M ID g g g
21 1 22 1 21( , )
( || ( ) || ) || ( ( || ))A x
ID y y
B T e g h
M ID g g g M MAC M M
3 21 1( , )
( || )y
e g h
M MAC M M
Figure 1: The ID-Based Explicit Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol
hIDB). Let M21 denote IDB||M211||M212.
Bob sends M2 = M21||M22 to Alice.
3. Alice computes KV MAB = e(g, h)
x,
VM22=MACKV MAB(M1||M21). If M22 6=
VM22 , Alice rejects and aborts the
protocol. Else if M22 = VM22 ,
Alice accepts, computes KMAB =
e(M211, hIDA)(M212)
rIDA , sets KAB =
KMAB
x as the session key. Then Alice
computes M3 = MACKMAB(M21||M1),
and sends M3 to Bob.
4. Bob computes KV MBA = e(g, h)
y, VM3 =
MACKV MBA(M21||M1). If M3 6= VM3 ,
Bob rejects and aborts the protocol. Else




This section presents a security model, the
proof in the model and security properties of
our protocol.
4.1 Security Model
Our security model is based on the model of
Blake-Wilson etc[22] for key agreement proto-
cols and a no-matching definition in [23]. The
no-matching definition is also adopted in [15].
In the model, an oracle Πsi,j models the be-
havior of a party with identity i carrying out a
protocol session in the belief that it is communi-
cating with a party with identity j for the s-th
time, where i, j ∈ I, s ∈ N1. The total number
of possible parties is denoted by symbol |I| and
the total session number is denoted by symbol
|N1|. One oracle instance is used only for one
time, which maintains a variable view consist-
ing of the oracle’s protocol transcripts so far.
An adversary is modeled by a probabilis-
tic polynomial time Turing machine that is as-
sumed to have complete control over all com-
munication links in the network and to inter-
act with parties via oracle accesses. The adver-
sary A is allowed to execute any of the following
queries.
• Corrupt (i). This allows the adversary to
get the long term private key of the party
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i. If party i doesn’t exist, the system will
setup a private key for the party, and send
the private key to the adversary.
• Send (Πsi,j, X). The adversary sends a
message X to the oracle Πsi,j. The system
will give an output of Πsi,j to the adver-
sary as response. If X = λ, the party i is
asked to initiate a session s with party j,
where λ is an empty string.
• Reveal (Πsi,j). This asks the oracle Πsi,j
to reveal whatever session key it currently
holds.
An oracle exists in one of the following sev-
eral possible states:
• Accepted : an oracle has accepted if it de-
cides to accept, holding a session key, after
receipt of properly formulated messages.
• Rejected : an oracle has rejected if it de-
cides not to establish a session key and to
abort the protocol.
• Unsettled : an oracle is unsettled if it has
not made any decision to accept or reject.
• Revealed : an oracle is opened if it has
answered a Reveal query.
• Corrupted : an oracle is corrupted if it
has involved in a Corrupt query.
By Πs
′
j,i, matching oracle of Π
s
i,j, we mean
that every message that Πsi,j sends out is sub-
sequently delivered to Πs
′
j,i, with the response of
Πs
′
j,i to this message being returned to the Π
s
i,j
as the next message. The detail definition can
be found in [17] or [22].
By No-Matching(·) event, we mean that
when our protocol is running against an adver-
sary, there exists an oracle Πsi,j which has ac-
cepted but there is no oracle Πtj,i which has en-
gaged in a matching conversation to Πsi,j, where
j has never been corrupted.
By fresh oracle Πsi,j, we mean that the ora-
cle Πsi,j is Accepted, not Revealed, party j is not
Corrupted, the oracle Πtj,i is not Revealed if Π
t
j,i
is a matching oracle of Πsi,j.
A Test query is defined for session key se-
crecy.
• Test(Πsi,j). If an oracle Πsi,j is fresh, an
adversary can make a test query to it. To
answer the query, the oracle flips a fair
coin b ← {0, 1}, and returns the session
key holding by oracle Πsi,j if b = 0, or else
a random key sampled from key space if
b = 1.
After Test query, the adversary can continue
making queries to oracles except the Corrupt
query to the party j, and the Reveal query to
oracle Πsi,j and its possible matching oracle Π
t
j,i.
To complete the function of Test query, the
advantage of an adversary is defined. After all
possible queries are made, the adversary output
a bit b′. The advantage is defined as:
Adv = |Pr[b′ = b]− 1/2|
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To define an explicit authenticated key
agreement protocol, we should prove that the
protocol satisfies the following goals:
1. Correctness. If two oracles are matching,
then both of them are accepted and have
the same session key which is distributed
uniformly at random in the session key
sample space.
2. Secrecy. Adv is negligible.
3. Authentication. The probability of No-
Matching(·) is negligible.
Remarks
Another query is about State(·)[24]. These
queries are disabled in the above model so that
the model cannot capture the SSR property or
known session-specific temporary information
security. A protocol satisfying SSR property
means that the protocol session key is produced
together by long term secret key and temporal
key material[24]. This fashion itself has advan-
tages and disadvantages[22]. Since the session
key of our protocol is produced solely by tem-
poral key materials, we are intended to exclude
the special query.
4.2 Security Proof
The three goals are separately proved in
three theorems. The first is dedicated for Cor-
rectness, the second for Authentication and the
last for Secrecy. The second conclusion is used
in the proof of the last theorem.
Theorem 4.1. If two oracles are match-
ing, then both of them are accepted and have a
same session key which is distributed uniformly
at random in the session key sample space.
Proof. Suppose two oracles Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i.
Assume the oracle Πsi,j receives the Send (Π
s
i,j,
λ) query. Then the oracle Πsi,j acts as an initia-
tor and Πtj,i as a responder. Before the initiator
accepts, the initiator has a view (M1, M2) which
is identical to the view of responder because the
initiator and responder are matching. At that
point,
KMji = e(M11, hj)(M12)
rj =
e((g1g
−j)x, hj)((gT )x)rj = e(g, h)x= KV Mij
and the initiator and responder has identical
vector (M1||M21), so the equality M23 = VM23
holds. The initiator will accept according to
the protocol and give the last message to the
responder.
Before the responder accepts, the responder
has a view (M1, M2, M3) which is identical to
the view of initiator. At that point,
KMij = e(M211, hi)(M212)
ri =
e((g1g
−i)y, hi)((gT )y)ri = e(g, h)y= KV Mji
Similarly, the responder will also accept.
The session key is Kji = KM
y
ji =
e(g, h)xy= KMxij = Kij , where e(g,h) can be
determined by public parameters. The session
key is distributed uniformly in GT since the ex-
ponent x and y are selected uniformly during
the protocol execution. 2
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Theorem 4.2. The probability of No-
Matching(·) is negligible.
Proof. Note that our No-Matching(·) event
only requires one party remaining not Cor-
rupted. So we divide the proof into two parts.
The first part is for an initiator and the second
part is for a responder.
Case 1: the probability of No-Matching(·)
for an initiator is negligible.
The proof includes two phases. The
phase one is to conclude the indistinguisha-
bility of two distributions {M1||M21||M22} and
{M1||M21||MACK←K(·)}. {M1||M21||M22} is
a set of bit string which is concatenated
by protocol messages M1, M21 and M22.
{M1||M21||MACK←K(·)} is a set of bit string
which is concatenated by protocol messages M1,
M21 and a MAC tag computed by a random
MAC key and M1||M21. The phase two is
to reduce an adversary’s advantage to a MAC
forger’s advantage.
Phase 1.1: Suppose there is a p.p.t algo-
rithm D. D can distinguish {M1||M21||M22}
and {M1||M21||MACK←K(·)} with a non-
negligible advantage and without the private
key of the message M1’s reception party. Then
we can construct an algorithm B to solve the
truncated decisional q-ABDHE problem.
B takes as input a challenge (g′, g′q+2, g,
g1, . . . , gq, Z), where Z is either e(gq+1, g
′) or
a random element in GT .
B simulates a PKG as follows. B generates
a random polynomial f(z) ∈ Zp[z] of degree q.
It sets h = gf(α), computing h from (g, g1, . . . ,
gq). Other public parameters gT and MAC are
defined the same as those in the protocol spec-
ification. The public parameters are (g, g1, h,
gT , MAC). There is no master-key belonging
to B.
B generates user keys as follows. To gen-
erate a private key for identity ID ∈ Zp, if
ID = α, B uses α to solve the truncated
decisional q-ABDHE problem immediately. If
ID 6= α, let FID(z) denote the (q−1) degree
polynomial (f(z) − f(ID))/(z − ID). B com-
putes (rID, hID) to be (f(ID), g
FID(α)). This
is a valid private key for ID, since gFID(α) =
g(f(α)−f(ID))/(α−ID) = (hg−f(ID))1/(α−ID) as re-
quired. Note that if Corrupt queries are less
than (q − 1) times, the generated private key
has identical distribution as in a real protocol
context because of the randomly selected f(z).
Let f2(z) = z
q+2 and let F2,j(z) = (f2(z) −
f2(j))/(z − j), which is a polynomial of degree
q + 1. Then B generates M∗1 ||M∗21||M∗22 by pro-
tocol simulation, where M∗1 ||M∗21||M∗22 denotes
a special bit string to feed algorithm D. Let
M∗1 = M
∗












MAC key KM∗ji are calculated according to pro-
tocol specifications. Let s∗ = (loggg′)F2,j(α).
Then if z = e(gq+1, g





T , which are the same as M11 and
M12 in a real protocol run where participant j
selected a random exponential value s∗x∗. If
z 6= e(gq+1, g′), M∗1 is not a valid protocol mes-
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sage.
Now B takes the simulated message
to play a game with D. The game
is that a fair coin is made by B and
then the simulated message M∗1 ||M∗21||M∗22 or
a special message M1||M21||MACK←K(·) in
{M1||M21||MACK←K(·)} is given to D accord-
ing to the value of the fair coin. We use the sym-
bol M b1 ||M b21||M b22 to denote D’s input. Note
that B can feed D its input in an interactive
way. For example, B simulates all participants,
runs all oracles according to protocol specifica-
tions except oracles Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i. D can corrupt
any parties except j. When D sends λ to an or-
acle Πsi,j, M
b
1 is responded. When M
b
1 is firstly
received by Πtj,i, M
b
21||M b22 is included in the re-
sponse.
If Z = e(gq+1, g
′), the simulated message
is a qualified real message as we stated previ-
ously. By our assumption, D should have a non-
negligible advantage to win the game. However
if Z 6= e(gq+1, g′), D has no advantage, which
will be argued shortly. By the advantage dif-
ferences, B can solve the truncated decisional
q-ABDHE problem.
We argue D’s zero advantage when Z 6=
e(gq+1, g
′) as follows. First of all, KM∗ji in the
simulated message is just a uniformly random
and independent value from the viewpoint of D
since the private key of party j, (rj, hj), is not
disclosed to D, and the first part of the private
key, rj, is a uniformly random and independent
value. So the MAC tag part M∗22 in the simu-
lated message and MACK←K(·) in the special
message are indistinguishable for D. We con-
tinue to say that it is also impossible for D to
distinguish M∗1 in the simulated message from
M1 in the special message. If D can distinguish
them, then D can distinguish a simulated mes-
sage from a real protocol message, which can be
used to distinguish the challenge directly. Note
that whether the simulated message is a real
protocol message depending on the value of Z.
To conclude phase 1.1, we say that if trun-
cated decisional q-ABDHE problem is hard,
the private key of M1’s reception party is not
disclosed and the number of disclosed private
keys is less than (q − 1), two distributions
{M1||M21||M22} and {M1||M21||MACK←K(·)}
are indistinguishable.
Phase 1.2: Suppose the probability of No-
Matching(·) for an initiator is non-negligible.
Then there is an adversary A who can make an
oracle Πsi,j accepted with a non-negligible prob-
ability while there is no matching oracle.
B is now a chosen message MAC attacker.
B accesses a MAC oracle and obtains MAC tags
from the oracle. B’s task is to give out a qual-
ified MAC tag which is not generated by the
MAC oracle. B runs A by protocol simulation.
According to our protocol, B sets parame-
ters and runs the protocol on behalf of all par-
ticipants. B picks parties {i, j} and a session
s, guessing that A will succeed against initiator
Πsi,j oracle.
B answers all A’s queries itself according to
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protocol specifications if party j is not related.
Note that the Corrupt query about party j is
not allowed. When the reception oracle of a
message M1 is a session of party j, B will use
its MAC oracle to compute the MAC tag in mes-
sage M2 responding to M1. When a message M2
claims coming from j, and the intended recep-
tion oracle is not Πsi,j, B will recompute a tag
using its MAC oracle to continue play the game
with A. While the intended reception oracle is
indeed Πsi,j, B will take the responding M2 as a
valid forgery.
Let’s analyze B’s advantage. First of all,
A cannot distinguish whether B’s MAC oracle
is used because of the conclusion of phase 1.1.
So If B’s guessing is correct with a probability
1/|I|2|N1|, A should have non-negligible advan-
tage to make oracle Πsi,j accepted while there
is no matching oracle. According to protocol
specification, accepted oracle Πsi,j means that
the MAC tag in M2 is the same as the MAC
tag computed locally by oracle Πsi,j. In the sim-
ulation scenario, it means the MAC tag should
be a valid one. So if the M1||M21 has never been
queried to B’s MAC oracle, B can success with
a non-negligible probability.
If the M1||M21 has been queried, B must do
it on behalf of an initiator oracle Πs
′
i,j or a re-
sponder oracle Πt
′
j,i, where i is determined by
the ID in the exponent part of M21. The initia-
tor oracle should be independent of oracle Πsi,j,
that is, s′ 6= s. However, since a random value
x is used to generate M1, the event is negli-
gible that two independent oracles select one
same value x ∈ Zp. The responder oracle Πt′j,i
must have received M1 before the oracle needs
a MAC operation. It is negligible for the oracle
Πt
′
j,i to receive M1 before Π
s
i,j really produced it
since the random value x is embedded in mes-
sage M1. However, if oracle Π
t′
j,i received mes-
sage M1 after Π
s
i,j produced it, the oracle Π
t′
j,i
has a matching conversation to Πsi,j. To con-
clude, the probability that M1||M21 has been
queried is negligible.
To conclude phase 1.2, we give a more con-
crete expression to show B’s advantage. While
the advantage of A is ε, the advantage of B is
ε
|I|2|N1|−ε1, where ε1 is the probability that mes-
sage M1||M21 has been queried to B’s MAC or-
acle. Since B’s advantage should be negligible,
it is clear the probability ε should be negligible.
Case 2: the probability of No-Matching(·)
for a responder is negligible.
Again, there are two phases. The first
phase is to conclude the indistinguishabil-
ity of two distributions {M1||M2||M3} and
{M1||M2||MACK←K(·))}. The second phase is
to reduce an adversary’s advantage to a MAC
forger’s advantage.
Phase 2.1: It is similar with the proof in
case 1. The adversary D now is limited not
to obtain the private key of the message M2’s
reception party. The simulator B simulates a
PKG and generates user keys the same as it
does in case 1. The number of disclosed pri-
vate keys is limited to be less than (q − 1). B
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generates M∗1 ||M∗2 ||M∗3 by protocol simulation
as follows. B firstly selects a party i as the
message M2 reception party. Then B gener-












are calculated according to the protocol specifi-
cation.
B then plays a game as in case 1 with
D except that the used simulated message is
M∗1 ||M∗2 ||M∗3 . Again D has zero advantage
when Z 6= e(gq+1, g′). At last, if the truncated
decisional q-ABDHE problem is hard, the pri-
vate key of the message M2’s reception party
is not disclosed, and the number of disclosed
keys are less than (q − 1), two distributions
{M1||M2||M3} and {M1||M2||MACK←K(·)} are
indistinguishable.
Phase 2.2: Again an adversary A is as-
sumed. A chosen message attacker B for a MAC
algorithm is used. B now picks parties {j, i}
and a session t, guessing that A will succeed
against a responder Πtj,i oracle. B plays a game
with A similar with what they done in case 1
except the replacement of identity j by identity
i, M1 in case 1 by M2, M2 in case 1 by M3,
Πsi,j in case 1 by Π
t
j,i. The MAC verification for
M22 in case 1 now doesn’t need a MAC oracle.
The same replacement can be used to analyze
B’s advantage to conclude that if the message
M21||M1 has never been queried to B’s MAC or-
acle, B can success with a non-negligible prob-
ability.
If the M21||M1 has been queried, B must do
it on behalf of an initiator oracle Πs
′
i,j where j
is determined by the ID in the exponent part
of message M1 or a responder oracle Π
t′
j,i with
t′ 6= t. Since a random value y is embedded in
the M21 message, the probability is negligible of
two independent responder oracles selecting one
same value y ∈ Zq. Note that M21||M1 should
be generated by the responder oracle Πtj,i for
verification, where M21 is a locally stored mes-
sage and M1 is received by Π
t
j,i. If the initia-
tor oracle Πs
′
i,j has queried the same message
M21||M1, the oracle should form this message
by locally stored M1 and received M21. So the
first flow generated by Πs
′
i,j is received by Π
t
j,i
except a negligible probability that another ini-
tiator oracle selecting the same random value
x in the exponent part of M1. The M21 in the
second flow generated by Πtj,i is received by Π
s′
i,j
except a negligible probability that another re-
sponder oracle selecting the same random value
y in the exponent part of M21. While the initia-
tor and responder agreed on the M21||M1, the
MAC tag M22 generated by Π
t
j,i should be the
same as the verification MAC tag generated by
Πs
′





i,j. Also the initiator and respon-
der should have the same view on M3 if they
have the same view on M21||M1. So the initia-
tor oracle Πs
′
i,j and responder oracle Π
t
j,i have
a matching conversation, contradicting to the
no-matching assumption.
To conclude phase 2.2, we also give an ex-
pression to show B’s advantage. While the
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advantage of A is ε, the advantage of B is
ε
|I|2|N1|−ε2, where ε2 is the probability that mes-
sage M21||M1 has been queried to B’s MAC or-
acle. Since B’s advantage should be negligible,
the probability ε should also be negligible.
At last, we conclude that the probability of
No-Matching(·) for a responder (an initiator) is
negligible if the private key of an initiator (a re-
sponder) is not Corrupted, the number of Cor-
rupted keys is less than q−1, and the truncated
decisional q-ABDHE problem is hard. 2
Theorem 4.3. The Adv is negligible.
Proof. Let A be an adversary who has non-
negligible Adv in the defined model. We con-
struct an algorithm B to solve the truncated
decisional q-ABDHE problem. B takes as in-
put a random truncated decisional q-ABDHE
challenge (g′, g′q+2, g, g1, . . . , gq, Z), where Z is
either e(gq+1, g
′) or a random element in GT .
B simulates a PKG as follows. B generates
a random polynomial f(z) ∈ Zp[z] of degree q.
It sets h = gf(α), computing h from (g, g1, . . . ,
gq). Other public parameters gT and MAC are
defined the same as those in the protocol spec-
ification. The public parameters are (g, g1, h,
gT , MAC). There is no master-key belonging
to B.
B generates user keys as follows. To gen-
erate a private key for an identity ID ∈ Zp,
if ID = α, B uses α to solve the truncated
decisional problem immediately. If ID 6= α,
let FID(z) denote the (q−1) degree polyno-
mial (f(z) − f(ID))/(z − ID). B computes
(rID, hID) to be (f(ID), g
FID(α)). This is
a valid private key for ID, since gFID(α) =
g(f(α)−f(ID))/(α−ID) = (hg−f(ID))1/(α−ID) as re-
quired.
B answers adversary queries as follows.
• Send(Πsi,j, X). Firstly B guesses that the
oracle Πsi,j should be fresh and be tested.
Generally, suppose that Πsi,j is the initia-
tor. Again let f2(z) = z
q+2 and let F2,j(z)
= (f2(z)− f2(j))/(z− j), which is a poly-
nomial of degree q + 1. B then simulates
the protocol for Πsi,j according to the pro-
tocol specification except that:
1. M11 = g







2. B finds out who received M1 from
Πsi,j and who sent M2 to Π
s
i,j. If B
finds an oracle Πtj,i, B directly use
KMJI as KV MIJ to compute the
value VM22 . If B decides to set or-
acle Πsi,j as Accepted, B uses the
temporal value y in Πtj,i to compute
Kij = KV M
y
ij. Else B stops the
game with a Fail output.
For any other Send queries that are not
related to the guessed oracle, B will act
exactly according to the protocol specifi-
cation.
• Corrupt(i). If i 6= α, B gives the private
key of i as response. Else if i = α, B
solves the truncated decisional problem.
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• Reveal(Πsi,j). B gives the session key cur-
rently held by the oracle Πsi,j. Note before
the oracle Πsi,j is Accepted, the session key
is λ.
• Test(Πsi,j). If B made a wrong guess, B
stops the game with a Fail output. Else
B flips a fair coin b ← {0, 1}, and returns
the session key holding by the oracle Πsi,j
if b = 0, or else a random key sampled
from the key space if b = 1.
If the adversary really shows its advantage,
B will guess Z = e(gq+1, g
′). If the adver-
sary has no advantage at all, B will guess
Z 6= e(gq+1, g′).
Analysis
If B does not stop before the output event, the
simulation is indistinguishable. Firstly, if the
number of Corrupt queries is less than (q−1),
the generated private key has identical distri-
bution as in a real protocol context because of
the random selected f(z). Secondly, the out-
puts of other queries are generated according
to the protocol specification or the model rules
if we don’t consider the oracles Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i.
Thirdly, the adversary can not distinguish be-
haviors of oracles Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i in the simulation
from behaviors of them in a real protocol con-
text. Assume s = (loggg
′)F2,J(α), then related
messages and values are compared in table 1.
It is clear that if Z = e(g′, gq+1), messages
and related values are reasonably to be real pro-
tocol messages and real protocol values. How-
ever, if Z 6= e(g′, gq+1), the messages and val-
ues are not qualified to claim as protocol mes-
sages and values. However, if the adversary
can distinguish the simulation from real proto-
col context, then the adversary can distinguish
whether Z = e(gq+1, g
′), which contradicts the
truncated decision q-ABDHE assumption.
Now we calculate the probability that B
does not stop. First of all, if B has made
a wrong guess, B stops. There are at most
|I|2|N1| oracles. So the probability of B’s right
guess is at least 1/|I|2|N1|. Even if B have
made a right guess, B may stops due to the
lost of Πsi,j oracle’s matching oracle. However
from theorem 2, we know that if j has not been
Corrupted, the number of Corrupted keys is less
than q− 1, and q-ABDHE problem is hard, the
probability of No-Matching(·) for Πsi,j is negli-
gible. Here we use ε3 to denote the negligible
probability.
In general, B will have a probability 1−ε3|I|2|N1|
to justify adversary A’s advantage. When Z =
e(g′, gq+1), the adversary should show its ad-
vantage to B. When Z 6= e(g′, gq+1), the ses-




or just a random value in GT . Since rj is not
disclosed to the adversary, the value Ki,j is just
a random value from the view of the adversary.
So there is no advantage for the adversary at all.
Now B’s strategy works. However, B should
have no advantage so that A’s advantage should
be zero too. 2
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M11 M12 KMJI or KV MIJ
Real g(α−J)xr e(g, g)xr e(g, h)xr
Simu& Z = e(g′, gq+1) g(α−J)xsz e(g, g)xsz e(g, h)xsz
Simu& Z 6= e(g′, gq+1) g(α−J)xsnz e(g, g)xsnz(Z/e(g′, gq+1))xsnzs e(g, h)xsnz(Z/e(g′, gq+1))
rJ xsnz
s
Table 1 Messages and values in different scenarios
4.3 Performance
First of all, let’s show our protocol perfor-
mance and the reason of the performance. In
our protocol, the computation load for an ini-
tiator is the same as the load for a responder.
The computation for one oracle includes 4 times
exponentiation operations, 2 times MAC oper-
ations, and 2 times pair operations. We think
that the computation load is a cost to obtain a
standard proof. In fact, our protocol is as prac-
tical as Gentry’s encryption scheme. Provided a
more efficient ID-based encryption scheme with
standard proof, it is easy to give a more ef-
ficient protocol with the same protocol design
and proof method.
As we have said that we failed to find some
direct related works, we found no explicit au-
thentication protocols with a stand proof in the
ID-based field to be compared with ours. We
note that the protocol in [24] has similar goals
with ours but in a traditional field. Thanks
to many advantages of ID-based cryptography,
such as no need for certificates etc, our proto-
col has some advantages in application over the
protocol in [24] but not in efficiency.
4.4 Security Properties
We consider the following common security
properties.
• Known session keys. The Reveal query is
designed to capture the notion. The fresh
condition has never restricted adversary’s
Reveal ability to any oracles except the
tested oracle and its possible matching or-
acle.
• Unknown key share. Suppose that a Πsi,e
oracle and a Πtj,i oracle holding the same
session key. An adversary could simply re-
veal the key held by Πsi,e, and pick Π
t
j,i as
the tested oracle. In this way, the adver-
sary defeat the secrecy goal in the model.
• Impersonation attack resistance. If a Πsi,e
oracle accepted, the authentication goal
assures there is only one matching ora-
cle Πte,i becasue the probabilities of No-
Matching event and Multi-matching [17]
event are all negligible. So an imperson-
ation attack can appear only with a neg-
ligible probability.
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• Key compromise impersonation resilience.
Note that the authentication goal is
proved while only one party’s private is
limited not to be Corrupted. So even one
player’s private key is Corrupted, nobody
can cheat the player to be accepted with
a impersonated ID.
• Perfect forward secrecy. Here we just in-
formally claim that our protocol enjoy the
property. The session key in our proto-
col is just related to two temporal ran-
dom values in Zp. The session key has no
relation to long term keys. So even long
term keys are Corrupted, it just means
that MAC keys can be obtained. Even
an adversary knows e(g, h)x and e(g, h)y,
there is still a computation hard problem
to obtain e(g, h)xy.
• Session State Reveal. The property con-
siders what happened when temporal
state values are revealed. Apparently, the
leakage of temporal value x or y in a ses-
sion means that an adversary can imper-
sonate a responder or an initiator in that
session. If all temporal values are re-
vealed, the session key will be disclosed.
However the bad result is limited to this
session only. One session with a new tem-
poral value will not be affected by the
leakage of temporal values in another ses-
sion.
5 Conclusion
We proposed an ID-based protocol and a
standard proof. The protocol employs a new
method to isolate session keys from key confir-
mation keys. Due to the method, there is no
direct usage of hash functions in the protocol
and there is no random oracles in the proof pro-
cedure.
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